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WHAT’S IN THE CLOUD? - AN
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF
CLOUD STORAGE USAGE ON THE
BROWSER CACHE
Graeme Horsman
Teesside University
g.horsman@tees.ac.uk

ABSTRACT
Cloud storage is now a well established and popular service adopted by many individuals and
organizations, often at a scaled cost, with free accounts also available. It provides users with
the ability to store content on a cloud service provider’s infrastructure, offering the benefit of
redundancy, reliability, security, the flexibility of access, and the potential assumed the liability
of the provider for data loss within the contexts of a licensing agreement. Consequently, this
form of remote storage provides a regulatory challenge as content which once resided upon
a seized digital exhibit, available for scrutiny during a digital forensic investigatory, may
no longer be present where attempting to acquire access to it creates costing and juridical
difficulties. This article offers a digital forensic examination of trace-evidence left in the
Internet browser cache following cloud storage account usage and interaction. Following
interactions with Dropbox and Google Drive in the Chrome browser, testing demonstrates
the possibility to recover data capable of facilitating a partial reconstruction of a user’s cloud
storage account, with results offered and contextualized.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Cloud Storage, Investigation, Cache, Dropbox, Google Drive

1.

INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing is now revolutionizing the
way individuals create, access, and store digital content (Ruan et al., 2011). The ’Cloud’
(a term often used to encapsulate all cloud
technology service variants) is multifaceted,
with options available to the user which range
from simple storage facilities, to access to
specialist software and hardware platforms
(Birk et al., 2011). While an in-depth discussion of cloud technologies is beyond the
scope of this work (see Hayes (2008); Mell
c 2020 JDFSL

and Grance, (2011); Ruparelia, (2016); for a
dialogue on this content), defining the Cloud
and its coverage is necessary despite not being straightforward due to its multiple areas
of coverage, of which attention is drawn toward Mell, and Grance’s (2011 p.3) proposed
interpretation.
"Cloud computing is a model for enabling
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with minPage 1
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imal management effort or service provider
interaction." (Mell and Grance, 2011 p.3)
One of the many benefits offered by cloud
service providers is the ability for users to
store their digital content within a Cloud
infrastructure, which has even seen law enforcement utilize such platforms to store large
quantities of video footage generated as part
of their investigations, for later review (Microsoft, 2016). This is typically referred to as
’cloud storage’ where currently, a reported 1.9
billion consumers to have accounts (Statista,
2018c). While forms of a local digital data
storage continue to play an important role
in the configuration of many computing and
mobile systems (a position which is unlikely
to drastically change in the immediate future), there are now many cost-effective (in
some cases, free) cloud service provider options available for a user who wishes to place
their data beyond the confines of their current device’s local storage facilities. In doing
so, the user acquires the benefit of redundancy, reliability, security, flexibility of access, and the potential assumed liability of
the provider for data loss within the contexts
of a licensing agreement. Consequently, due
to its increasing popularity of using this form
of remote data storage creates a regulatory
concern, particularly for those involved in the
investigation of digital offenses.
Typically, a ‘traditional’ DF investigation
commences with an examination of lawfully
seized digital devices and any form of digital
storage media which they contain. Prior to
cloud technologies, an examination of locally
resident content would arguably often result
in the ability to determine the way in which
a user has interacted with their device and
what content they possess, or have created
and interacted with. Yet, despite increases
in storage media capacities, which are also
now more affordable, non-local cloud storage
facilities offer an alternative and popular option for robust and secure storage of personal
Page 2
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data. Currently, it is estimated that approximately 3.6 billion users utilize cloud storage
services in 2018 (Statista, 2018a), with Dropbox alone claiming 500 million users in 2016
(Dropbox, 2016). While cloud storage maintains many clear benefits for the user, such
platforms are abused (Choo and Dehghantanha, 2016), where those tasked with investigating such events are posed with a number of
investigatory challenges. Those who choose
to implement cloud technology as part of any
suspected offense create an issue for those
tasked with investigating a suspected offense
(Grispos et al., 2012; Zargari and Benford,
2012; Thethi and Keane, 2014), where Dykstra and Sherman (2011, p47) note, cloud
storage may be used as an ’an accessory to a
crime’.
Acknowledgment of the potential for abusing cloud storage technology has long been
noted (BBC News, 2011). Any form of remote storage beyond the direct access and
scrutiny of law enforcement arguably creates
regulatory concerns. As a result, attention
is placed on the provider and any mechanisms in place designed to detect abuse of
their services. In reality, this is an impossible
task, and although service provider agreements make users concede not to utilize their
cloud technology for illegal acts, there are
those who seek to misuse these services where
prohibiting these acts is difficult. While protocols to identify known or notable files may
be in place, beyond the knowledge of the user,
obfuscation of key files via encryption prior to
upload would likely render the provider powerless to detect that illegal content is being
stored by a user. One of the main concerns of
cloud storage providers is the ability to store
images depicting child sexual abuse (IDCSA)
(Europol, 2014) with cloud storage reportedly
being utilized to store and share IDCSA on a
number of occasions (BBC News, 2013; BBC
News, 2017; O’Connell, 2018).
c 2020 JDFSL
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This article offers a forensic examination
of the impact of cloud storage usage via an
Internet browser on the cache to identify
the existence and interpretation of digital
trace evidence to support law enforcement
investigations. Section 2 provides a discussion surrounding the challenges posed by the
Cloud, where Section 3 presents an examination of the browser cache following Dropbox
usage with Section 4, examining the impact
of Google Drive on the browser cache. Finally,
conclusions are drawn.

2.

PROBLEMS WITH
THE CLOUD

Anyone involved in criminal acts where liability will ensue if illegal content is found
within their possession will likely view cloud
storage as a method of protecting themselves
by storing content in a place that may not
be easily identified. One of the fundamental
issues that cloud storage facilities provide is
a lack of direct and immediate physical access to content (Dykstra and Sherman, 2012;
Zawoad and Hasan, 2013; Simou et al., 2014),
where different challenges are encountered depending on the service model which is implemented by the user (Alqahtany et al., 2015).
In the context of a user who has access to
a cloud storage facility, digital data which
formerly resided on a local device may no
longer be present following its transfer to the
Cloud and any further accesses to it might occur remotely through a cloud storage portal
(browser-based or mobile application, etc.).
Further, traces of any digital data prior to
it being moved to the Cloud may no longer
be available on a local device. In each case
the challenge of any forensic investigation
where a cloud storage account has been used
is twofold; first, identifying that a cloud storage service is being used by a suspect and
second, identifying what is in there in order
c 2020 JDFSL
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to ascertain potential accountability for criminal acts (Zawoad and Hasan, 2012; Quick et
al., 2013; Daryabar et al., 2017). A concern
exists that it may not be possible for an investigating practitioner to establish either of
these points following a forensic examination
of any seized devices.

2.1

Access to the Cloud

Assuming that a DF practitioner can identify
that a suspect has operated a cloud storage
account, they may seek (with appropriate
guidance and authority as part of an investigation) to examine content stored within it.
To achieve this, they may attempt to acquire
credentials to access a cloud account (either
from a seized device or suspect, accompanied by relevant legal authority) or seek legal
disclosure of account information from the
provider directly. Such processes can be timeconsuming, expensive, and have varying rates
of success due to procedural irregularities or
non-compliance (Dykstra and Sherman, 2011;
Marturana et al., 2012). Figure 1 provides a
high-level overview of the decisions involved
in the investigation of a cloud storage account
believed to be involved in a suspect offense.
There are three investigatory paths to proceed with acquiring access to a cloud storage account. The first follows a request directly to the cloud service provider following
the correct disclosure requirements have been
met, accompanied by the necessary legal authority. Procedural requirements are often
defined within a provider’s terms and conditions and legal guidance, which is often
supplied on their websites. In some cases,
a law enforcement portal is available specifically for request purposes. Following a submission request, the provider determines its
validity taking into account their licensing
agreements and operational arrangements before deciding whether to make an account information disclosure. Where a provider exists
beyond the jurisdiction in which the current
Page 3
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access to a suspect account. While this option may offer a quicker route to accessing
a cloud account, providers can update and
change the way their service operates, preventing such methods from being forensically
exploited.

Figure 1. The high-level stages involved during an investigation involving a suspected
cloud storage account.

investigation is taking place, difficulties can
arise due to, in some cases, a lack of legal
enforcement issues and compliance. While
a disclosure request is likely to be the main
option for obtaining a complete depiction of
a suspect’s cloud storage account, the timely
cooperation by a service provider along with
procedural efficiencies and costs has raised
concerns (James and Gladyshev, 2016; Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology,
2016; Casey et al., 2018).
Second, a suspect may choose to selfdisclose the content of their accounts or provide access to it. Subject to requisite legal
authority to access and utilized such disclosed
content, the practitioner may be able to extract and examine content within cloud storage. Finally, following an investigation of any
of a suspect’s seized items (computer, mobile
device, etc.) it may be possible to extract
cloud storage account credentials and utilize
them to attain a remote login to the cloud
storage account (see tools such as Magnet
AXIOM Cloud) (Martini et al., 2016). Again,
while the required legal authority is needed,
this option provides potentially the quickest
Page 4

Despite these three options being available
to law enforcement, prior to any stages involved with securing access to the account,
those involved must first have some form of
reasonable grounds first to suspect that cloud
storage facilities have been used as part of
an offense, and second, maintain some indication as to what they expect to be stored
within the account or how they believe it
has been used. Access to a cloud account
can be a resource-intensive process. Therefore a decision to pursue access should be
made following information which provides
some form of reasonable suspicion that content within it will be of evidentiary value to
a current investigation. While legal requirements differ between jurisdictions and service providers, typically, such requirements
are in place to prevent unnecessary privacy
breached and collateral intrusion. In the UK,
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 provides the power to compel suspects
to disclose their passwords (see RIPA section
49), with the recent case of Stephen Nicholson demonstrating prosecution for failing to
provide access to his Facebook account (Sky
News, 2018). Such methods may be seen as
a way to potentially circumvent the difficulties associated with seeking disclosure from
a service provider.
Given the issues noted previously in sections 1 and 2, establishing such evidenceof-use may be an issue. In the last eight
years, academic literature has focused on
documenting the forensic challenges posed
by cloud platforms (see, for example, Aminnezhad et al., 2013), but minimal attention
to the browser cache has been paid.
c 2020 JDFSL
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2.2

The Cache

Providing private modes have not been utilized, the Internet browser cache on most
mainstream browsing applications provides
an insight into the content hosted on the
sites visited by the user. The browser cache
is frequently acknowledged but rarely the
sole focus of digital forensics research (see
Horsman, 2018a; 2018b for some examples
of cache-focused work). In the context of
the Cloud, this is also often the case, where
for example Malik et al., (2015) focus on
cloud storage application artifacts omitting
an analysis of the cached content from basic
browser-based interaction with a cloud storage account, which can be a potential source
of content cached from a result of their visit
and interaction with their storage account.
Section 3 and 4 demonstrates the potential
value of the browser cache as part of an investigation into cloud storage usage.

3.

METHODOLOGY

The testing undertaken followed the Framework for Reliable Experimental Design
(FRED) research model (Horsman, 2018c).
All testing carried out within this article was
completed using test Dropbox and Google
Drive accounts with uniquely identifiable
data (both in terms of content; pre-hashed
for identification purposes, and filename)
to examine account usage behaviors in the
cache. Interaction with these accounts was
carried out on a clean install of the Windows 10 operating system with logins and
access to the cloud storage accounts undertaken through the Chrome Internet browser
(version 67.0.3396.99) due it its reported dominant share of the market in terms of users.
Subsequent analysis of the Chrome cache following cloud storage account activity was
carried out utilizing Nirsoft’s (2018) ‘ChromeCacheView v1.77’, a cache parsing application. Testing was iterative, examining indic 2020 JDFSL
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vidual account actions, then repeating test
results for reliability purposes.

3.1

Dropbox

This section explores the impact on the Internet browser cache following user interaction
with a Dropbox cloud storage account.
3.1.1

Dropbox ‘On-Landing’:Account Metadata

An examination of the cache following landing on the www.dropbox.com site, the www.
dropbox.com.html file is of interest (see Figure 2). Here, details of the cached site HTML
structure is available for query. While this
file does not render when placed back into the
browser window itself allowing a visual inspection of the site’s elements (a typical process
implemented in forensic investigations in order to force the browser to re-render a cached
site’s architecture), its internal HTML code
can still support the identification of Dropbox content when a user has viewed their
account online using Chrome.

Figure 2. Chrome cache content following a
visit to www.dropbox.com.
To commence, following an examination
of the \$www.dropbox.com.html\$ file and
its contents (an example content is captured and provided below for reference), the
"PAGE_LOAD_TIME": tag entry denotes a
UNIX Epoch timestamp which following testing indicates the time the page was last
Page 5
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loaded. Following a live examination of the
Dropbox homepage source code indicates this
value is also updated when the page is refreshed. Therefore the value reflects a ’last
load time,’ which could be either an initial
visit or page refresh. In the case of the former, this time may be cross-referenceable
against Internet history timestamp information if present. As a result, this time stamp
allows a practitioner to determine what files
were in the Dropbox account at a given time,
taking into account the information discussed
in the following sections of this article.
Also, data contained in the { "LOCALE:̈}
parenthesis depicts metadata surrounding
the account, which has been accessed
through the web browser (shown below).
The display_name¨: tag value reflects the
’Name’ value assigned to the account (defined by the account holder during signup). The "id¨: tag value provides an account identifier, which can also be attributed
to account activity (see Section 3.1.2 for
further details). The "email¨: tag value
provides the email address of the account
signed in during the Dropbox session, and
the "photo_circle_url¨: tag value contains the URL for the profile picture assigned
to the account. A third party can access this
URL to display the image if it remains hosted
on the Dropbox servers. If no profile image
has been set, this value is set to NULL.

What’s in the Cloud?

_root_permissions\": \"edit\", \"has_
never_set_password\": false, \"id\": 7
7837232, \"sso_required\": false, \"di
splay_name\": \"Grey Joy\", \"_authed\
": true, \"home_ns_id\": 126648836, \"
lname\": \"JOY\", \"role\": \"personal
\", \"is_email_verified\": true, \"fna
me\": \"GREY\", \"cdm_path\": \"\", \"
email\": \"grey.joy@googlemail.com\",
\"is_paper_disabled\": false, \"accoun
t_id\": \"dbid:AAAAz7mAv7FTO-BYzKWNpC
1uj3FaJ1wVfBA\", \"is_cdm_member\": f
alse, \"nid\": \"01529833775757704936
\", \"is_dropbox_admin\": false, \"pai
d\": 0, \"root_ns_id\": 126648836, \"p
hoto_url\": null, \"is_team_admin\": f
alse, \"familiar_name\": \"GREY\", \"is
_team\": false, \"photo_circle_url\":
"https://dl-web.dropbox.com/account_pho
to/get/dbaphid\%3AAACJ-_rJyCoDzFXXbB8MD
aBqtStmlN-pZdY?circle_crop=1\\u0026size
=128x128\\u0026vers=1530383091362\"\}]\
}, \"DEFAULT_ROOT_NAME\": \"Dropbox\",
\"PERSONAL_ROLE_STRING\": \"Personal\"}
\}
3.1.2

Home Screen Activity

The www.dropbox.com.htm file also maintains structural information regarding the
Dropbox web pages visited by a user, with the
starting point for analysis being the Dropbox
‘Homepage’. The Dropbox ‘Homepage’ maintains by default a list of the 10 most recent
activities undertaken by the user. However,
this list does offer a user the chance to expand this view. Figure 3 provides an example
of the Dropbox Homepage, where key page
artifacts have been highlighted. This demonstrates how this data are presented in the
www.dropbox.com.html file and the meaning of associated metadata retained.
Every single entry on the ‘Recent’ list on
the Dropbox homepage is structured within
the www.dropbox.com.html file as follows:-

\{\"LOCALE\": \"GB\", \"prompt_ha_hidi
ng\": true, \"_viewer_properties\": {\
"display_name\": \"GREY JOY\", \"can_
moderate_comments\": false, \"deprecat
ed_first_user_in_the_cookie_id\": 778
37232, \"is_reseller_session\": false
, \"is_team_assume_user_session\": fa
lse, \"is_assume_user_session\": fals
e, \"_user_data\": [\{"initials_url\":
\"https://ac.dropboxstatic.com/accoun
t_photo/get_initials?initials=GJ\\u00
26size=128x128\\u0026vers=0\", \"user "recent_activities\": [{\"when_milli\
Page 6
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therefore depending on the time that the
www.dropbox.com.html file is cached by
the browser, further accesses may have
occurred but not have been reflected in
the cached data. The "activity_key¨ is a
Base64 encoded value which when decoded is
typically formatted as follows - RecentActivity:9:1530369097.0:b83eb2e68208a518422612
ee639c60fd. Following testing, the RecentActivity timestamp was shown to be
the same as "when_milli¨ timestamp.
Figure 3. The Dropbox ‘Home’ screen showAlthough there appears to be a hash-type
ing recent user activity.
alphanumeric string (seemingly of structure
type MD5) value, this value changes when
the same file (identical, verified by hash) is
": 1530296324000.0, \"resource_id\":
uploaded and when file names are changed
\"id:WftHZCn1cXAAAAAAAAACXg\",\"rela
ted_activity_keys\":[\"RmlsZUFjdGl2aX and therefore testing suggests this value
R5OldmdEhaQ24xY1hBQUFBQUFBQUFDWGc6Zml cannot be used as a unique identifier for
the file which has been accessed on the
sZV9vYmpfa2V5\"], \"iewing_user\": {
account.
The "viewing_user:̈ value
\"id\": 77837232}, \"recent_event_ty
corresponds
to the account ID (shown in
pe\": 0, \"activity_key\":\"UmVjZW50
section 3.1.1 regarding account metadata).
QWN0aXZpdHk6MDoxNTMwMjk2MzI0LjA6Yjgz
The "home_display_type¨: value indicates
ZWIyZTY4MjA4YTUxODQyMjYxMmVlNjM5YzYw
the type of artifact where FILE indicates
ZmQ\",\"id_type\":\"ENCODED_FILE_OBJ
a stored file, and SHARED/_FOLDER
_ID\",\"activity_data\": {\"home_dis
indicates a shared folder item.
play_type\": \"FILE\"}, \"skeleton_
Finally, the d̈isplay_name¨: value corredata\":{\"context_display_name\":\"P
ersonal\",\"context_display_path\":\"\ sponds to the file/folder name shown to the
",\"filter_types_by_key\":{\"RmlsZUFj user, which has been assigned to the file when
dGl2aXR5OldmdEhaQ24xY1hBQUFBQUFBQUFDW uploaded.
If the user expands a Recent event which
Gc6ZmlsZV9vYmpfa2V5\": 1}, \"display_
contains
one or more files (typically images,
name\": \"Scre-en Shot 2018-05-19 at
see for example in Figure 3 where 2 images
21.12.40.png\",\"icon\": \"page_whit
are stated indicating two images are stored
e_picture\"}\}]
within an expandable menu), a 100*100 preThe "when_milli¨ timestamp reflects the view image will be displayed to the user of
‘informal’ value displayed to the user. For each file (see Figure 4). Following testing,
example, in Figure 3 where Fig 4.png is when a user expands these menus within
shown to have been opened ’1 minute ago’, their browser window, these preview images
the "when_milli¨ UNIX Epoch timestamp
are cached with typical file names structured
when converted depicts the actual time
as size=100x100size_mode=4.jfif indistamp. Whenever an entry on the Recent cating that it is an expanded menu previewed
list is interacted with (a file/folder is opened, file which has been cached, and therefore files
viewed, etc.), this timestamp is dynamic and
cached with this name can be attributed to
updates to reflect the time of this interaction, this form of Dropbox activity. When the
c 2020 JDFSL
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browser cache is parsed, the cached file’s associated URL contains the file’s original filename; therefore, it is possible to identify the
filename given to the file by the user, which
has been cached.

/32x32/1/_/1/9/Fig\%204.png/EKCxq9
oKGDUgAigC/BHWu3g9fdmJx3Q8jvCrer
6wyjxqgFwqz8aGQqcJOJIgtK_P3ZoDGQ
7i28B7mUqml1uRWaj91cg0ufX5_orq8
B2MM4nX2bTqQD5jRmYf2g4S15VSRpE
wPmjJ4Wto6ewHcOLc?size=32x32\\u0
026size_mode=1\", \"is_cloud_doc\":
false, \"is_in_team_folder_tree\":false
, \"user_id\": 1023627536, \"fq_path\":
\"/Fig4.png\",\"ts\":1530266052,\"previ
ew_type\": \"photo\", \"sjid\": 47, \"
size\":\"13.08KB\",\"type\":1,\"ns_p
ath\":\"/Fig4.png\",\"direct_blockser
ver_link\":\"//dleb.dropbox.com/get/F
ig\%204.png?_subject_uid=1023627536\
\u0026w=AAAEDd5K1Al-duuO9ccAm_1evI1KP
Figure 4. An example expanded preview on
lpnJ1brSTb14RZ8vQ\",\"sort_key\":[\"
the Dropbox Homepage.
Mzk1BA8GCEdDNQENAdwMAA==\"], \"is_unm
ounted\": false,\"file_id\":\"id:1go4O
3.1.3 ‘Files’ View
NUabqAAAAAAAAAAQw\", \"is_symlink\":
false, \"icon\": \"page_white_picture_
When a user navigates to the ’Files’ page
(which lists all files in the user’s Drop- 32\", \"ago\": \"29/6/201810:54\",\"by
tes\": 13399,\"
box account) in their Dropbox account (a
preview_url\":\"https://photo
URL of https://www.dropbox.com/home is
recorded in the address bar and Internet his- s-6.dropbox.com/t/2/AABriBxPofqyc7o
nrTIpCz8jC4Rngx2egmWGaTv398FafA/
tory), a home.html file is cached denoting the
structure of the ‘Files’ Dropbox page. When 12/1023627536/png/32x32/1/_/1/9/Fi
g\%204.png/EKCxq9oKGDUgAigC/BHW
attempting to determine the contents of this
u3g9fdmJx3Q8jvCrer6wyjxqgFwqz8aG
page, the event_type parenthesis contains
QqcJOJIgtK_P3ZoDGQ7i28B7mUqml1u
information regarding each item shown to
RWaj91cg0ufX5_orq8B2MM4nX2bTqQ
be in the Dropbox account onscreen, with
a typical structure shown below. Figure 5 D5jRmYf2g4S15VSRpEwPmjJ4Wto6ew
demonstrates how this metadata is visually HcOLc?preserve_transparency=1\\u00
26size=32x32\\u0026size_mode=1\",
linked to a typical Dropbox page.
\"ext\":\".png\",\"revision_id\":
{\"event_type\": 1, \"beacon_context\" \"2fab4ad8a0\", \"ns_id\": 287380
9056\}
:"AAB8jgVq6lHPiMD6YF4zX8v44x_N2V
WkQ8M\",\"href\":\"//www.dropbox.c
om/pri/get/Fig\%204.png?_subject_uid
3.1.4 Viewing an Individual File
=1023627536\\u0026w=AAAEDd5K1AlduuO9ccAm_1evI1KPlpnJ1brSTb14RZ8v
When an individual picture file is viewed
Q\",\"is_dir\":false,\"thumbnail_url_tm from within Dropbox (for example, a picture
pl\":\"https://photos.dropbox.com/t/2 is clicked upon expanding the user’s view of
it as shown in Figure 6), this previewed file is
/AABriBxPofqyc7onrTIpCz8jC4Rngx2eg
mWGaTv398FafA/12/1023627536/png
cached by the browser with a filename strucPage 8
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Figure 5. An example of a typical ’Files’
Dropbox page indicating which metadata is
cached.
ture of size=32x32size_mode=5.jfif.
Files with this naming structure can be
attributed to the act of viewing an individual
file on Dropbox. As noted above, with the
caching of expandable menu previewed files,
the cached file’s associated URL maintains
the original file name of the cached image,
which the user has attributed to this file
on the Dropbox account (for example,
www.dropbox.com/home?preview=FILEN\
\AME.png. Metadata regarding individually
viewed files is cached in a text file which
the following testing has the following
naming convention where %2FFILENAME
reflects the name of the file on Dropbox, and
therefore, metadata can be correlated to it is_xhr=trueactivity_context=3activity_con
text_data=%2 FFILENAME.txt. This file
is typically structured as follows:-

JDFSL V15N1

lname": "Joy", "role": "personal",
"photo_circle_url": null, "fname": "Gr
ey", "email": "", "unique_id": "dbid:
AADHAYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y"}]
, "latest_revision": {"direct_blockse
rver_link": null, "rev_owner": null,
"preview_link": null, "when": 152777
1969.0, "revision_id": "BHX_hi0zgCXy
4-p6eC24vvjrGN5PLYSOlDs
Bmq7FVv3yMmUF6ZoTN4RE3d2VRQpkO_rcrLw
GthE79-hPoSieEdeZhdkY0hjD5gBUwiAvWcFN
xfSHCBgRpPxSlL4X2mMH1mo"}, "file_icon
": "page_white_picture", "owner": {"d
bx_account_id": "dbid:AADHAYZBkFdb6Wk
H63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y", "initials_url"
: "", "email": "", "lname": "", "role"
: "personal", "photo_circle_url": null
, "fname": "", "display_name": "", "id
": 1023627536, "unique_id": "dbid:AADH
AYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y", "ph
oto_url": null}, "is_dir": false, "fq
_path": "/Fig 5.png", "when_milli":
1527771969000, "comment_activity_dicts
": [], "name": "Fig 5.png", "context_
data": "/Fig 5.png", "when": 15277719
69, "actor": {"dbx_account_id": "dbid:
AADHAYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y",
"initials_url":

{"status": "ok", "payload": {"can_edit
_feedback": true, "resolved_comment_co
unt": 0, "feedback_off": false, "users
_to_notify": [{"dbx_account_id": "dbid
:AADHAYZBkFdb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y"
, "initials_url": "https://ac.dropboxs
tatic.com/account_photo/get_initials?
initials=GJ\u0026size=64x64\u0026vers Figure 6. A demonstration of an individual
file preview showing comment information
=0", "id": 1023627536, "photo_url":
and file metadata.
null, "display_name": "Grey Joy", "
c 2020 JDFSL
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A Dropbox user can also comment on
the files they have uploaded to their account, and in turn, if the file has been
shared with another user, they can also
make comments. When comments are made
(shown in Figure 6), the s\_xhr=true&
actvity_cont=3activity_context_data=
%2FFILENAME.txt file maintains addition "comment":
tags. Examples of comments and comment
metadata are provided below.

What’s in the Cloud?

the third party commenter, and the "id":
tag does not maintain the account holder’s
unique id, rather the value is typically set to
0. As a result, while a 3rd party account can
be partially identified, it may not be possible to identify the actual account (or submit
a disclosure request to Dropbox) if account
name metadata has been changed
3.1.5

File Sharing and Deleted Files

Each Dropbox account also has a ’Sharing’
page (visits to this page generate the URL
"comment": {"resolved": false,
https://www.dropbox.com/share in the In"comment_meta_json": null,
ternet history), which depicts the files and
"comment_text": "LOTS OF COMMENT TEXT", folders which have been shared with the user’s
"client_id": null, "when_mses":
account. When a user interacts with this
1530907487537, "commenter_dict":
page, following an examination of the cache,
{"dbx_account_id":
no records of the page content and shared files
"dbid:AADHAYZBkF
could be located. Similarly, Dropbox maindb6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y",
tains deleted files for 30 days where a user
"initials_url":
can view and restore this content. No records
"https://ac.dropboxstatic.com
attributable to deleted file records could be
/account_photo
identified in the browser cache during test
/get_initials?initials
visits to the deleted files pages. As a result,
=GJ\u0026size=64x64
the browser cache is unlikely to provide any
\u0026vers=0", "id": 1023627536,
records of content from a user account that
"photo_url": null, "display_name":
has been deleted or shared.
"Grey Joy", "lname": "Joy", "role":
"personal", "photo_circle_url": null,
"fname": "Grey", "email": "",
4. GOOGLE DRIVE
"unique_id": "dbid:AADHAYZBkF
Section 4 provides an analysis of ‘Google
db6WkH63Kk_th-sjvKcj1Gq7Y"},
Drive’, a cloud storage service comparable to
"comment_gid":
that of Dropbox. Those who have a Google
"c365OFsrDbAAAAAAAAAABg",
account also have access to Google’s cloud
"when": 1530907487,
storage facility ‘Google Drive,’ and at the
"reply_to_activity_key":
time of writing, Google offers 15 GB of stornull, "raw_comment_text":
age free to account holders. Forensic analysis
"LOTS OF COMMENT TEXT"},
of Google Drive demonstrates that despite
Comments can be replied to directly by a
being a comparative platform to Dropbox,
third party account where the original owner the behavior of this service within the web
of the file directly links their account to
browser cache presents a greater challenge to
a comment. Where a third party replies, those seeking to investigate the usage of cloud
display_name, lname and fname tags will
storage accounts of this type. In contrast to
reflect the third party’s account details. No
Dropbox analysis, the Chrome browser cache
email address information is available for retains limited information depicting a user’s
Page 10
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interaction with their Google Drive account
with the remainder of this section demonstrating this.
As a starting point for analysis, the Google
Drive Home screen is examined. The Home
URL for a Google Drive visit is structured
as https://drive.google.com/drive/mydrive with Figure 7 depicting the Home
screen site structure.
The ‘My Drive’ link documents a scrollable
list of all contents within the Google Drive
account. Unlike Dropbox, on-landing, site
strutal .html content is not locally cached,
and therefore no metadata regarding stored
files visible to the user onscreen can be extracted and examined from the browser cache
(unlike Dropbox). As a result, from the cache
alone, testing indicated that is was not possible to ascertain the names and associated
metadata of content stored in the account.
While this, compared to Dropbox, is a limiting factor for practitioners who are tasked
with a cloud storage account investigation,
some image caching does occur. The Google
Drive Home screen maintains two types of
thumbnail image, ‘Quick Access’ (files typically cached with a file name of w300-k) and
‘File List’ thumbnails (files typically cached
with a file name of w32-h32-p-k-nu) (shown
in Figure 7). Following testing, no user assigned and attributable file name information
was available.
An examination of all files cached (cache
content was captured using Nirsoft’s (2018)
’ChromeCacheView v1.77’ and keyword
searched for file names (uniquely attributed
to test data) and associated onscreen visible metadata) following a visit to the Google
Drive Home screen failed to identify file related metadata of cloud storage content. This
indicates that Google Drive account metadata content is not cached on the local device.
The URL associated with Google Drive activity also offers limited information. When
c 2020 JDFSL
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Figure 7. The Google Drive Home screen
structure.

an image is previewed from the Home screen,
the URL does not change (it remains - https:
//drive.google.com/drive/my-drive.
However, previewed images are cached with
a typical file name of w1366-h662), meaning
analysis of Internet history is unlikely to
reveal significant information regarding
account content. When a user navigates
to a folder they have created within their
account; the URL is typically structured
as
https://drive.google.com/drive/
folders/0By-CihkhmywOek1Gak4ySlhnQkk.
The bolded section appears encoded and
does not change when the folder is renamed,
indicating that it is unlikely to hold obfuscated folder name information. As a result,
an analysis of internet history is unlikely to
reveal account usage behavior.
Google Drive is also part of Google’s suite
of tools offered to a Google account holder,
where a user who has files of the type that
can be placed under the umbrella term of
‘office documents’, can automatically utilize
Google Slides, Docs, and Sheets to open, view
and edit them. When a user selects an office document of any type and is directed to
an appropriate Google facility (either Docs,
Sheets or Slides), testing showed that the
content of these documents is not cached by
Chrome (following extraction of the Chrome
Page 11
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cache and the utilization of keyword and file
carving techniques).

5.

RESULTS AND
CONCLUDING
THOUGHTS

The use of cloud storage facilities now means
that digital forensic practitioners face an increased likelihood that localized forms of data
storage may not contain all of a user’s owned
and potentially evidentiary digital content.
Whilst procedures are in place to request
account content disclosure from a service
provider and to seek account credentials for
future access; such methods are not a guaranteed way of establishing access to a user’s
account (see, for example, Google’s (2017)
Transparency Report documenting acts of
compliance to requests and disclosure of account data). It is key to note that often a
request for account access must be made following some form of a reasonable belief that
content within the account may be relevant to
an investigation where measures are often in
place both jurisdictionally and in the terms of
service of many providers to protect a user’s
privacy in the context of using such services.
Acquiring such reasonable belief requires an
investigation of the surrounding facts of a
case and information available to an investigator, of which one key source (dependent on
the platform in use) may be that of the Internet browser cache. Localized forms of cached
cloud storage activity have been overlooked
by current academic research in digital forensics and cloud storage investigations. Yet,
testing demonstrated in this article reveals
that the act of accessing Dropbox via the
Chrome web browser leads to what can be
arguably considered comprehensive caching
of their account content and its associated
metadata. While the same level of caching
was not witnessed with Google Drive, testing
Page 12
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demonstrates that even though the value of
the browser cache in cloud storage investigations varies depending upon the service in use
by a suspect, it should not be wholly disregarded as a source of potentially evidentiary
information. Subject to the deletion of cache
content (either through a browser’s inbuilt
cleaning features or via 3rd party deletion applications), cached content may influence law
enforcement decision making as to whether
to pursue a potentially time consuming and
costly disclosure request to a service provider.

5.1

A Comparison of Platform
Results

As each platform displays different caching
behavior, it is necessary to offer the following
breakdown of recoverable cached data as a
result of the use of each service.
Dropbox:
File Listings: Information regarding files
listed in the user’s Dropbox account, including any files within sub-folders, can be recovered from cached content. This includes not
only file names assigned by the user but also
timestamp information.
Images: Both thumbnail images and previewed images are cached.
Account information: Metadata, including
account holder information, email, and account identification, can all be retrieved from
cached .html files denoting the Dropbox account site’s structure.
File Comment information: Where a
comment has been left on a file within
the Dropbox account, comment content is
cached.
Descriptive Internet History: Where a
user accesses folders on their account, the
URL denotes the file and folder names associated with this content (for example- www.
dropbox.com/home/TESTFOLDERNAME).
Google Drive:
Images: Both thumbnail images and prec 2020 JDFSL
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viewed images are cached.
Despite a difference in the volume of content
cached between both services, it is critical to
note that in both cases caching in some form
does take place and therefore offers some use
to a practitioner examining a device. Particularly as noted in Section 1, where cloud
storage providers have been utilized to store
IDCSA when a user visits their account, testing suggests that image caching of viewable
content (see Horsman (2018d) for a discussion of the browser cache and viewable content onscreen) including preview thumbnails
will occur on both platforms. In such cases,
this may be enough for an examination to
identify that an account holds potentially relevant information providing that they can
attribute the cached files to an act of viewing
a cloud storage account through the browser.
This should be achievable by examining the
chronological timings of Internet history and,
as noted above, acknowledging files with the
naming conventions previously highlighted
and acknowledging that these have come from
a cached cloud storage account visit.

5.2

Limitations and Future
Work

Chrome remains a reported market-leading
Internet browser and, therefore, a chosen target of this work (Statista, 2018b). The results depicted may be transferable to other
web browsing applications, where further testing is required, but due to the exhaustive
number of services and browser platforms, it
was not feasible to achieve this within this
work. As a result, this work provides an entry analysis into this form of investigation to
inform practitioners of the potential presence
of such content and to incorporate this within
their investigation processes. The depiction
of cached cloud storage content is also subject
to changes over time, and as cloud service
providers update and adapt their platform, elc 2020 JDFSL
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ements may no longer be cached locally, or in
some cases, additional content may be cached.
As a result, cache analysis in this context is
a moving target with multiple variables that
may impact the success of determining how
someone is using their account. This work has
demonstrated that caching of cloud storage
artifacts can occur, and therefore it is argued
that the browser cache should not be disregarded when investigations of this type are
being undertaken. Future work must involve
the sustained research of Internet browser
cache behavior in this context, incorporating
both different browser platforms.
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